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PAKISTAN’S dire need to approach the IMF for financing has been widely discussed particularly
since US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statement that any IMF programme should not bail
out Chinese lending to Pakistan. The US has the largest quota (16.5 per cent) in the IMF, so its
concerns obviously carry weight. However, the popular perception that an IMF programme will
be tough only due to US pressure is misplaced. The real story might be the recently reformed
IMF lending rules in 2016, which prevent the Fund from bailing out a distressed sovereign’s
existing creditors.
A primer on IMF lending rules: It is important to understand upfront that the Fund’s lending
rules vary depending on whether a country requests ‘normal’, or ‘exceptional’ (ie very large)
access to Fund resources, with the bar of IMF conditions being higher for the latter. Pakistan’s
quota for normal access financing at the IMF is $2.85 billion. A request for Fund resources up to
435pc of its quota would be classified as normal access. For Pakistan, this amounts to $12.5bn.
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It would seem at first glance that Pakistan’s financing request to the IMF could be calibrated to
just under this amount in order to avoid the tougher conditions associated with exceptional
access. For instance, Pakistan might be able to borrow China, Saudi Arabia, Islamic Development
Bank, and other non-IMF sources to bring its external financing gap below $12.5bn. However,
there is a snag. Pakistan already owes $6bn in outstanding loans to the Fund from previous
programmes and this counts towards the $12.5bn.
A debt re­profiling could kill four birds with
one stone.
So, even with a new programme of size $6.5bn Pakistan will be considered an exceptional access
case. Separately, if Fund disbursements over the first 12 months of the programme exceed 145pc
of quota (around $4bn for Pakistan), this too would result in exceptional access, regardless of the
total size of the new programme.
The upshot is that there are a range of plausible scenarios in which Pakistan ends up being
subject to the Fund’s exceptional access criteria. The toughest of these is that the IMF requires
adequate safeguards on debt sustainability.
The Fund will make two assessments in this regard.
First, the Fund will decide what zone of debt sustainability Pakistan falls in. If the debt is
unsustainable, it is classified in the Red Zone; if the debt is sustainable, but not with a high
probability, it is classified in the Grey Zone; sustainable with a high probability falls in the Green
Zone.
The Fund pays attention to two main variables when assessing the zone of debt sustainability:
debt to GDP ratio, and gross public financing need/ GDP. For Pakistan, the former is close to the
IMF’s high-risk threshold for emerging markets (70pc of GDP), while the latter is well above the
corresponding high-risk threshold for emerging markets (15pc of GDP); these thresholds are
discussed in the recent Argentina exceptional access programme request in 2018. Given this, it
seems unlikely that the Fund will classify Pakistan in either the Green Zone or the Red Zone, and
it is likely to end up in the Grey Zone.
Second, the Fund must decide if the conditions mandated by its exceptional access lending rules
are satisfied for the zone of debt sustainability the country is assessed to be in.
On this, the Fund’s exceptional access lending rules generally require that countries falling in the
Grey Zone undertake some kind of re-profiling operation on its existing loans. This is to ensure
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IMF money is not used to pay off other junior creditors — something the Fund regretted doing
during the 2010 Greek bailout.
A re-profiling is a lighter form of restructuring which usually involves a lengthening of the debt’s
maturity, with no change in the nominal principal or interest payments. In Pakistan’s case, the
re-profiling could cover the sovereign’s external commercial debt, as well as bilateral loans from
China as well as Paris Club creditors.
Should Pakistan re-profile its debt?: Governments generally balk at the idea of undertaking any
restructuring of their debts (even of the light re-profiling variety mentioned here), because they
are afraid of being shut out of markets for extended periods of time. However, this calculation
may be misplaced given recent evidence that ‘light restructurings have a smaller, if any, impact
on market access loss compared to deeper restructurings’. Moreover, the evidence on re-profiling
of debt by Pakistan (1999), Uruguay (2003) Cyprus (2013) and Jamaica (2013), indicate that re-
profiling of debt “did not have destabilising effects on the banking system”.
Moreover, a re-profiling will mean that IMF money will not disappear abroad as payments to
external creditors but can be used to give breathing space to the new government to smooth out
its fiscal adjustment efforts.
Pakistan already has some experience with such operations. It restructured a Eurobond in 1999
and received rescheduling treatments from the Paris Club in 1999 and 2001. These treatments
helped restore Pakistan’s debt sustainability.
In sum, if Pakistan does engage the IMF, the engagement is likely to be via the exceptional access
window which has tighter conditions attached to it. With regard to debt sustainability, the Fund’s
lending rules may require Pakistan to re-profile its existing debt. While this may seem like
painful medicine, it may not be so bad, especially for an incoming government that can blame
the current woes on the previous governments’ reckless borrowing.
Critically, a debt re-profiling could kill four birds with one stone: it would address US concerns
that China should not be bailed out. It would be even-handed because all external creditors
(including China and the Paris Club creditors) would be approached for a rescheduling. It would
meet IMF requirements. And it would keep critical foreign exchange within the country, thus
mitigating the pain that has to otherwise be inflicted on citizens. Still, Pakistan’s long-term debt
problems require long-term solutions: more efficiency in SOEs, a stronger workforce, better tax/
GDP ratios, and so on.
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